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ISSN 0341 - 0787.I. The Debt Overhang of Developing Countries*
Even seven years after the debt crisis erupted the highly indebt-
ed developing countries have not grown out of their payments dif-
ficulties. The Baker initiative of 1985 which envisaged growth
and adjustment-oriented external financing for the most important
problem borrowers turned out to be a failure. The external in-
debtedness of all developing countries increased by another 50
per cent in the 1982-1989 period, and exceeded US$ 1200 billion
recently. However, the continued debt accumulation did not help
to overcome any of the most serious economic problems facing the
majority of Third World economies encountering debt-servicing
difficulties [for statistical details, see IMF, 1988]:
- Compared to the stagnation or even decline in the early 1980s,
real GDP growth of countries with recent debt-servicing prob-
lems (problem borrowers) recovered somewhat in 1983-1987. None-
theless the growth rate of about 2 per cent remained less than
half of that experienced in the late 1970s. Per-capita income
continued to stagnate in many of these economies. On the con-
trary, countries without debt-servicing problems returned
quickly to the path of nearly 6 per cent annual growth of GDP
after a short and minor decline in 1981-82.
- The performance of problem borrowers was even worse with re-
spect to gross capital formation. The average investment ratio,
which amounted to more than 25 per cent of GDP in 197 8-1982,
remained persistently below 20 per cent in the 1983-1988 peri-
od. Consequently, the future growth prospects of this country
group look rather grim. Again in sharp contrast, the countries
without debt-servicing problems succeeded to sustain investment
ratios of more than 26 per cent throughout the 1980s.
- Notwithstanding continued debt accumulation, the Third World
suffered from a substantial capital drain. Negative net trans-
fers, i.e. gross credit disbursements minus amortization and
interest payments, summed up to an outflow of US$ 100 billion
* This paper is part of a research project on the optimal
structure of capital transfers between developed and developing
countries. Financial support was provided by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft. Comments and suggestions by Ulrich
Hiemenz and Volker Stiiven are gratefully acknowledged.in 1984-1987 [World Bank, 1988b, Vol. 1]. The reversal of capi-
tal flows was most dramatic for the major problem borrowers,
but substantially less so for East Asia and the Pacific for
example.
- The market perception of the difficult situation facing many
problem borrowers is illustrated by the significant decline in
the secondary market valuation of Third World debt. The weight-
ed average discount for the debt of the 15 most heavily indebt-
ed countries exceeded 50 per cent in the second half of 1987
and early 1988; while the market valuation was close to 70 per
cent of the face value of the debt less than two years before
[IMF, 1988, p. 22b].
Recent discussions in the literature on the debt overhang of
developing countries suggest that the above phenomena are in fact
interrelated [see e.g. IMF, 1989, pp. 61ff.; Krugman, 1988]. A
debt overhang is defined by "the presence of an existing, 'in-
herited' debt sufficiently large that creditors do not expect
with confidence to be fully repaid" [Krugman, 1988, p. 2]. Sec-
ondary market discounts clearly reflect such expectations. It has
been hypothesized that a considerable debt overhang creates
strong disincentives for foreign creditors and investors to
transfer more capital and the capital-recipient countries to
implement growth-oriented adjustment programs.
A high debt burden is supposed to reduce the borrower's adjust-
ment incentives since all or most of the benefits from increased
output would go to foreign creditors [Sachs, Huizinga, 1987] .
This argumentation may be exemplified as follows [Sachs, 1989,
p. 275]: Assume that, under present economic policy conditions,
a borrower is able to service only part of his external debt.
The borrower may raise his future debt-servicing capacity to
some extent if he were prepared to sacrifice current consump-
tion and, correspondingly, raise investment in export-generat-
ing activities. However, this adjustment would be irrational
from the borrower's point of view. Reduced consumption today is
not offset by higher consumption in the future. The creditors
would reap the full benefits of internal economic adjustment,
unless the additional export earnings are high enough to allow
full debt service and compensate forgone present consumption.The reluctance of foreign creditors and investors to make more
funds available on a voluntary basis is attributed to the fact
that the market valuation of new capital transfers would become
identical to the value of existing claims [Dooley, 1986] . The
higher the current discount on inherited debt, the higher the
immediate capital losses of new creditors and investors would be.
Moreover, an increasing number of the problem borrowers' tradi-
tional creditors opt for exit bonds and similar instruments as a
means to refuse further "involuntary" lending to overindebted
countries . The attitudes of both new and old creditors may
render it increasingly difficult for borrowers facing a7 debt
overhang to check the capital outflow.
According to a widespread view the above disincentive problems
could only be overcome if the parties involved agree on some form
of debt relief. Even the US government, which strongly opposed
debt relief in the past, revised its debt strategy fundamentally
in March 1989. The initiative launched by the Secretary of the
Treasury, Nicholas Brady, strongly emphasized the importance of
debt reduction. The World Bank and the IMF were assigned a key
role in implementing the new approach. Although the particulars
have still to be negotiated, financial incentives for private
creditors participating in debt reduction schemes and official
credit guarantees are likely to be part of the deal. Probably,
the motivation of bank syndicates to grant debt relief will also
2
be strengthened by suspending standard credit contract clauses .
Consequently, the incentives of traditional creditors to extend
more credits to problem borrowers in order to protect existing
claims ("involuntary" lending; see Krugman [1988]) are increas-
ingly concentrated on a small number of highly exposed banks;
for them exit options are not attractive since they cannot
absorb the losses out of old debt.
2
This refers to the sharing clause and the negative pledge
clause in the first place, which aim at an equal treatment of
all members of bank syndicates as far as debt servicing is
concerned.The widespread view on debt relief as a panacea is challenged in
the following. In Section II it is shown that beneficial effects
of debt relief materialize only under very specific conditions.
Moreover the potential economic costs of reducing the overhang in
sovereign debt have to be considered. The sovereign risk per-
spective of international capital transfers is also important in
discussing alternative ways to strengthen the adjustment incen-
tives of today's problem borrowers and to check the current capi-
tal drain (Section III). Section IV summarizes the major find-
ings.
II. Debt Reduction: Panacea or Stalemate?
The above reasoning on the effects of a debt overhang suggests
that disincentive problems may result in a vicious circle of
underlending and insufficient internal adjustment by problem
borrowers. Arguably the present capital drain poses serious fi-
nancing constraints to economic policy reforms in the debtor
countries. The lack of growth enhancing reform packages which are
both consistent and credible further erodes the future debt-
servicing capacity of problem borrowers; it thus adds to the
reluctance of foreign creditors and investors to sustain, not to
speak of increasing, their financial engagement.
The argumentation also suggests that the borrowers have no in-
centive to break through this vicious circle unless the debt
overhang is reduced. In this view, it is up to the creditors to
take the first step. It is maintained that, by agreeing to some
form of debt relief, both the borrowers and the creditors would
be better off. However, this Pareto improvement can only be
achieved if the following conditions are met [for a formal analy-
sis, see Corden, 1988]:
- The reduction of the debt burden must be sufficiently large to
remove the disincentive effects on the borrower's adjustment
efforts; i.e., a cut in current consumption has to be offset by
increased future consumption.- At the same time, the reduction of the debt burden must be
sufficiently small to raise the ultimate stream of debt-service
payments to the creditors, compared to the situation without
relief [see Krugman, 1988, on the so-called Debt Laffer Curve].
The objectives of the subsequent discussion are: to present evi-
dence on the difficulties to achieve a Pareto improvement by
granting debt relief; to show that, under conditions of sovereign
lending, new disincentive problems may be created by debt relief
without solving the existing ones; and to develop the counter-
hypothesis that debt relief is no alternative to further financ-
ing if the capital outflow out of developing countries is to be
checked.
The effects of a debt overhang on economic adjustment and lending
as well as the role of debt relief in overcoming disincentive
problems are difficult to be evaluated empirically . However, a
recent analysis by Cohen [1989] suggests that the debt overhang
problem is far less dramatic than frequently assumed. The hypo-
thesis tested states that more nominal debt implies less market
value for this debt. If this relationship holds both creditors
and borrowers would be better off with some debt reduction. The
market value of the reduced debt would then exceed the market
value of total inherited debt. The critical question is whether
or not the elasticity of the market price of debt with respect to
its face value is strictly larger than one (in absolute terms). A
reduced form equation which allows the elasticity to depend upon
the market price level is tested for a sample of 16 countries
with a debt/export ratio of more than 3. The results show that
only if the current market price of debt is almost zero, the debt
overhang hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90 per cent level
of confidence. This applies to countries such as Sudan, Nicara-
gua, Peru, and Bolivia. For none of the major borrowing countries
This is largely due to the lack of comparable historical evi-
dence; for an interesting discussion on the similarities and
differences between the debt crises of the 1930s and 1980s, see
Eichengreen, Portes [1989] and the comments by Skiles [1989].facing debt problems the creditors can be confident that they
would gain if they agree to debt reduction schemes.
Moreover the following, though very simple test reveals that
favourable effects of debt relief on the borrowers' adjustment
incentives and the creditors' incentives to continue lending are
doubtful at best. It is assumed that the reschedulings of the
1980s provided for some, though rather modest relief in the sense
that debt renegotiation reduced the present value of future debt-
service payments. Consequently, the investment response of bor-
rowers should be positively related to the proportion of resche-
duled debt in total liabilities if disincentive problems were
reduced by debt relief. Similarly, a positive relationship should
hold between the quantitative role of reschedulings and the
amount of additional lending.
As a first test of these hypotheses, Pearson correlation coef-
ficients relating the quantitative role of reschedulings to over-
all investment and additional lending are presented in Table 1.
Alternative cross-country calculations are performed for a group
of 24 borrowing countries which rescheduled part of their debt,
and for a larger group of 36 major borrowers; the latter group
consists of the 24 borrowers with reschedulings as well as 12
borrowers without major debt-servicing difficulties. The quan-
titative role of reschedulings is proxied by the amount of debt
rescheduled in 1982-1985 (RESCH 1), and 1982-1986 alternatively
(RESCH 2), as per cent of outstanding debt in 1982. The invest-
ment response (I) is given by the change in the average invest-
ment ratio of 1986-1987 compared to 1983-1985. Similarly the
lending response is given by the change in average disbursements
(DIS), and net transfers (NT) respectively, both as per cent of
debt outstanding in 1985.
The calculations presented in Table 1 reveal positive correla-
tions between RESCH 1 and I as well as NT when the calculations
are based on the sample of all 36 borrowers. However, this result
does not provide strong support to the hypothesis of favourableTable 1 - Reschedulings, Investment Response, and Additional
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(1982-1986) as per cent
I : change in the average investment ratio, 1986-1987 vis-a-vis
1983-1985;
DIS( NT): change in average disbursements (net transfers) of long-term
debt from private sources, 1986-1987 vis-a-vis 1983-1985, as per
cent of outstanding debt in 1985;
* : indicates significance at the 10 per cent level of confidence.
The sample consists of 24 major borrowers with (different degrees of) re-
schedulings and 12 major borrowers which did not reschedule their debt in
the 1982-1986 period.
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1988-1989 edition, Vol. 1;
IMF, International Financial Statistics, var. iss.; own
calculations.
investment and lending responses to debt relief. The results may
rather be distorted if the sample consists of both credit con-
strained and non-constrained borrowers. For the latter type of
borrowers, which did not reschedule their debt, capital transfers
were demand determined; i.e., creditors had no disincentives to
continue lending. Moreover, the average investment ratio of the
12 countries without reschedulings was fairly high and stable
(1983-1985: 26 per cent); it exceeded the corresponding figure
for the 24 countries with reschedulings by nearly 8 percentage
points. In other words, the investment behaviour of non-con-
strained borrowers was not influenced by disincentive problems.
To avoid biased results the calculations are based on the group
of 24 problem borrowers in the second half of Table 1. All
Pearson correlation coefficients remain completely insignificantwhen only those cases are considered where disincentive problems
might exist. In other words, debt relief in the form of re-
schedulings did neither induce higher investments by problem
borrowers, nor additional lending to countries encountering debt-
service difficulties.
The conclusions from the above tests, though preliminary, are
twofold:
- Most of today's problem borrowers fall into the "weak debt
overhang" category. According to Claessens and Diwan [1989],
the debt overhang problem can be overcome without a reduction
of contractual debt obligations in this case, provided that new
loans are made available.
- Favourable effects of debt relief on economic adjustment are
not as straightforward as it is frequently assumed in the lite-
rature .
Against this background, it is not surprising that the commercial
banks were not prepared to engage in large-scale debt reduction
schemes in the past. After risk illusions were destroyed with the
eruption of the debt crisis in 1982, the sovereign risk of capi-
tal transfers to developing countries has become evident. Default
on sovereign debt is not only a matter of the borrower's ability
to service external liabilities, but also of his willingness to
pay [Eaton, Gersovitz, Stiglitz, 1986]. A substantial range of
discretion accrues to the debtor after the contract is concluded
and the capital is transferred. The honouring of contractual
obligations becomes a matter of cost-benefit calculus [Nunnen-
kamp, Picht, 1988]. Rational lenders will consider the borrower's
incentives to default willfully when deciding on whether or not
further credits are granted.
Similarly, sovereign risk plays an important role in the lenders'
attitudes towards debt relief. In practice the optimal degree of
debt reduction cannot be determined unambiguously. An agreement
on relief has to be the result of bargaining between debtors andcreditors. The former can be expected to redefine their bargain-
ing position and ask for more relief as soon as the latter indi-
cate that they are willing to forgive some debt. More important-
ly, commitments of the debtors to implement adjustment programs
after relief has been granted are as difficult to enforce by the
creditors as earlier commitments to abstain from willful de-
faults. Once relief is agreed upon, the reduced debt burden may
rather weaken the willingness to adjust within the debtor coun-
try. The balance in the political competition among interest
groups may shift towards those groups opposing economic reforms
which increase the country's social welfare, but affect group-
j
specific interests and rents negatively. The government's de-
termination to resist the opposition against reforms is likely to
deteriorate since relief reduces the political necessity to
undertake adjustments that have distributional consequences.
Difficult decisions can be deferred [for a detailed discussion of
the politics of adjustment, see Haggard, Kaufman, 1989].
Frequently it is argued that moral hazards can be avoided if debt
relief were made conditional on economic reforms by the benefi-
ciaries. Claessens and Diwan [1989], for example, assume that
conditionality is made operational by multilateral organizations
providing the "precommitment technology", i.e., making their own
lending conditional on policy actions and linking other lenders'
financing to official lending. However, conditionality is not at
all a new concept, and past experience suggests that it cannot be
enforced either. Letters of intent have often proved to be an
insufficient indication of reform-mindedness [for the problems in
program design and implementation, see World Bank 1988a, pp.
56ff.]. Moreover it is unlikely that the World Bank and the IMF
are willing to enforce conditionality rigorously, e.g. by dis-
continuing their financial relations with countries which refuse
to meet the policy conditions once debt relief has been granted.
It is rather in the organizations' self-interest to renegotiate
on conditionality ex post and ad hoc [on the self-interest of
international organizations, see e.g. Frey, Schneider, 1985;
Vaubel 1983; 1985].10
Private creditors seem well aware of the above enforcement pro-
blems. They still resist the public pressures to engage in large-
scale debt reduction schemes. This resistance is likely to con-
tinue unless the sovereign risks of debt relief are at least
partly assumed by the creditor governments and international
organizations, e.g. through official guarantees of principal and
interest payments, public funding of debt reduction programs,
generous tax allowances for debt write-offs, and increased offi-
cial lending [Institute of International Finance, 1989]. However,
the strategy of shifting the costs of debt relief to official
authorities and socializing the sovereign risks of lending to
developing countries is very likely to create new moral hazards,
without solving the existing enforcement problems [for a more
detailed discussion, see Nunnenkamp, 1988]:
- Taking away the risks from banks may encourage private credi-
tors to enter another round of "imprudent" lending, i.e. not
carefully evaluating the creditworthiness of individual bor-
rowers .
- Debt relief for problem borrowers discriminates against capi-
tal-recipient countries which successfully adjusted to external
shocks in the past and thus avoided to default on their debt.
Those countries' efforts to maintain debt-service payments in
the future may decline if they realize that economic policy
failures are rewarded ex post. Hence, debt relief involves the
risk of creating more problem cases [see also Buiter,
Srinivasan, 1987].
Moreover, it threatens to be at the expense of poor countries
strongly dependent on official lending if organizations such as
the World Bank get involved more closely into the external fi-
nancing of fairly advanced problem borrowers. This tendency is
already evident from the lending behaviour of multilateral offi-
cial creditors in the 1980s (Table 2). The structure of credit
disbursements shifted significantly towards higher-income devel-
oping countries encountering debt-service difficulties . Arguably
Similar shifts are to be observed for net transfers out of
multilateral official lending.11





































































Disbursements of public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt. - Baker-15 plus
Costa Rica and Jamaica.
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1988-89 edition. Vol. 1.
increased official lending to these countries contributed indi-
rectly to the subsidization of private creditors, in so far as
the adjustment needs of commercial banks were reduced. Notwith-
standing the overall increase in disbursements, the amount of
additional resources channelled to low-income countries stagnated
for several years compared to 1980. Especially many African
economies which experienced serious debt problems as well, though
being of minor importance for private creditors, suffered from
the (relative) decline in multilateral lending to this region. It
may become even more difficult for low-income countries to meet
their external financing needs in the future if the role of mul-
tilateral organizations in tackling the debt problems of fairly
advanced borrowers is extended, as suggested recently by the
Brady initiative.
Officially promoted debt relief may even have detrimental effects
on the perceived beneficiaries, as far as their future access to
private capital markets is concerned. The possible contribution12
of debt reduction schemes in checking the current capital drain
is frequently overstated. Table 3 reveals that the reversal in
international capital transfers is mainly a problem of drastical-
ly reduced inflows of new credits, rather than an increased debt-
service burden on existing debt. The evidence is most striking
for the financial relations of the Third World with private cred-
itors: For all developing countries, more than 70 per cent of the
change in average net transfers vis-a-vis 1980-1982 is to be
attributed to the reluctance of banks to extend new credits. In
the case of Latin America, i.e. the major problem region, resche-
dulings and debt renegotiation led to debt-service payments in
1983-1987 which were even lower than those in 1980-1982 . The
major challenge of credit constrained debtors, attempting to
j
check the capital drain, is thus to induce private creditors to
resume lending.
Especially for today's major problem borrowers debt relief offers
no promising alternative to further financing. Debt relief may
render it even more difficult to raise fresh money. Borrowers
have to take into account that they might be cut off from inter-
national capital markets after they have "succeeded" to obtain
relief on outstanding liabilities. Default on external debt can
generally be expected to involve costs for the defaulting coun-
tries in terms of market access, unless the borrowers can
credibly commit themselves against renewed demands for relief in
2 the future . From a sovereign risk perspective it is hardly con-
It was only for Bast Asia that higher debt-service payments
were the dominant factor in explaining reduced or negative net
transfers. In this region, however, the development of dis-
bursements and net transfers was mainly demand determined.
Several countries, such as South Korea and Malaysia, became
extremely reluctant to raise new loans and prepaid old debt.
2
Eichengreen and Portes [1989] have found no evidence that coun-
tries which defaulted in the 1930s incurred costs in terms of
inferior capital market access, once they reached settlement
agreements with the creditors. Neither defaulting nor non-de-
faulting debtors had significant access to foreign portfolio
capital after World War II. However, the conclusion that indi-
vidual bond holders did not discriminate between different
contin. on page 1213
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Net transfers represent the difference between gross disbursements of new loans, and principal and interest
payments (debt service) on existing debt (capital outflow in the case of negatively signed net transfers). -
Period averages; minor inconsistencies are due to rounding. - Public and publicly guaranteed long-term
debt from private creditors pius total private non-guaranteed long-term debt. - All changes vis-a-vis 1980-
1982.
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tabies, 1988-89 edition, Vol. 1.
types of debtors after losses were incurred in the 1930s, can-
not easily be applied to the current situation. Commercial
banks, which represent the most important group of private
creditors in the 1980s, are far better equipped than private
bond holders as far as comprehensive and differentiated risk
evaluation is concerned.14
ceivable that, at least in the short run, private creditors would
not remember their bad experience with borrowers unable or un-
willing to service their external debt. More specifically the
incentives for "involuntary" lending are reduced substantially
after having agreed to debt relief. It is no longer necessary to
protect existing claims by throwing good money after the bad as
soon as the losses out of old debt have been realized. Banks will
then refuse to participate in new financing packages and concert-
ed lending.
To summarize, the widely acknowledged steps towards debt reduc-
tion are rather unlikely to solve the disincentive problems which
characterize the capital transfer negotiations between private
creditors and the major problem borrowers currently. Debt relief
involves considerable economic costs for both the perceived bene-
ficiaries and non-beneficiaries . Especially third countries will
be negatively affected by public involvement in debt reduction
schemes. We have, therefore, to look for alternative ways to
overcome debt problems. Most importantly, the chances of develop-
ing countries to restore international creditworthiness have to
be discussed.
Ill. How to Restore Creditworthiness; Current Obstacles and Pos-
sible Solutions
The prospects for the resumption of private lending to developing
countries appear gloomy in view of the persistently high negative
net transfers. Sometimes it is even suggested that the present
attitudes of commercial banks render any attempts of borrowers to
regain international creditworthiness meaningless. In the fol-
Lamdany [1988] correctly argues that the debtor must ascribe a
higher value to his external debt than the creditor does, for
debt reducing buy-backs to take place voluntarily. Arguably the
favourable valuation of debt reduction by the debtors is at
least partly due to the neglect of the costs in terms of for-
gone future credits; whereas private creditors agree to buy-
backs exactly because exit options are offered.15
lowing, it is argued however that current problems are not in-
surmountable. Disincentive problems with regard to continued
lending and internal adjustment are supposed to be due to uncer-
tainties of both creditors and debtors concerning the distribu-
tion of losses from former lending and the institutional frame-
work for future lending, rather than being a consequence of the
debt overhang as such.
Uncertainties mainly stem from ongoing discussions on the role of
creditor governments and international organizations in assuming
part of the losses from former lending and the risks of future
lending. Commercial banks are strongly engaged in political lob-
bying on publicly subsidized exit options and official guarantees
of new loans. Similarly, debtor governments bargain on publicly
sponsored debt relief, thereby supporting those interest groups
which resist immediate and sweeping policy reforms. The wait-and-
see attitudes of creditors and debtors may be overcome, however,
if the "rules of the game" were clarified and the socialization
of losses and risks unambiguously rejected. Debtor countries
would then realize that there is no promising alternative to
economic adjustment. The internal power balance would probably
shift towards those interest groups supporting policy reforms.
This, in turn, may reduce the reluctance of private creditors to
continue lending.
Removing the distortions arising from public interference may
render it easier for individual debtor countries to influence the
decision making of private creditors. The decision to realize
exit options or to continue lending strongly depends on the cred-
itors' expectations on the borrowing country's ability and will-
ingness to service its debt in the future. Hence, borrowers may
attract new capital inflows by implementing economic policies
which enhance their future debt-servicing capacity and by cred-
ibly precommitting themselves against willful default.
Actually it has been shown in a recent empirical study on the
determinants of bank lending to developing countries in the 1980s16
that adjustment efforts by the debtors are honoured by the credi-
tors (Table 4). The estimates were based on cross-country regres-
sions run for a sample of 36 Third World economies that main-
tained considerable credit relations with Western commercial
banks . Separate estimates were performed for two subgroups of
credit constrained borrowers [for the classification of the
sample countries, see Nunnenkamp, 1989]: 14 borrowers for which
involuntary lending has been orchestrated, and 12 borrowers with-
out involuntary lending . Selected economic policy variables and
performance variables were considered as possible determinants of
net transfers from private credit sources (NTR, expressed as a
proportion of GNP) . Among the equations estimated, the following
figures prominently: ,
NTR = aQ + a1 INVR + a2 WMSHD + a3 REXR + a4 DEFR
where: INVR = gross fixed capital formation, as per cent
of GDP ;
WMSHD = annual change in world export market share
of sample countries;
REXR = annual change in real effective exchange
rate;
DEFR = government budget deficit, as per cent of
GDP
The empirical results summarized in Table 4 show that higher
investment ratios (INVR) and favourable world market performance
(WMSHD) induce higher net transfers from private credit sources.
The significantly positive coefficients of both variables indi-
cate that adjustment efforts by the debtors are honoured by the
creditor banks. This result also holds for credit constrained
debtors (with the exception of WMSHD in the case of constrained
Annual data for the years 1983-1986 were pooled in the OLS
regressions performed [for details, see Nunnenkamp, 1989].
2
The regime of involuntary lending includes countries for which
equiproportional increases in loan exposure were coordinated by
bank advisory committees in 1983-1987 [see the country list in
Watson et al. 1988, p. 28].
Explaining variables were calculated as two-period averages for
the years t and t-1. In this way a lagged impact on NTR may be
captured, and problems of simultaneity were reduced.17
Table 4 - The Impact of Economic Policy and Performance Variables on Net Transfers to Developing Coun-
tries from Private Credit Sources : Pooled Cross-Country Regression Results, 1983-1986
36 credit constrained and
non-constrained countries
14 credit constrained coun-
tries with involuntary
lending





















































Variables defined as follows: INVR: gross fixed capital formation as per cent of GDP; WMSHD: annual
change in world export market shares of sample countries; REXR: annual change in real effective
exchange rates (negative in the case of depreciations of the borrowers
1 currencies); DEFR: government
budget deficits as per cent of GDP. All explaining variables calculated as averages of periods t and
t-1; t-statistics in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent
level; for methodical details, see Nunnenkamp [1989].
Source: Own calculations.
borrowers without involuntary lending). The positive impact of a
favourable export performance on net transfers is most pronounced
for the regime of involuntary lending. All in all, the evidence
suggests that it pays for today's problem borrowers to implement
economic adjustment programs.
The overall explanatory power of the estimates in Table 4 remains
limited, however. Probably this is at least partly due to the
fact that few problem borrowers have embarked on comprehensive
and consistent policy reforms. The relationship between domestic
policies and net transfers from abroad is likely to become
stronger if remaining disincentives for internal adjustment were
removed. Both private creditors and creditor governments can and
should help to achieve this goal:
- Commercial banks may strengthen the debtors' confidence that
promising adjustment programs need not to be cancelled due to
financial constraints during the difficult transition period.
This may be achieved by establishing a "common fund", financed18
by the banking community, which is explicitly devoted to finan-
cial support of economic reforms in highly indebted countries.
The incentives of borrowers to implement immediate and sweeping
reforms would increase if they have to compete for the limited
funds available from this fund, and if the most successful
among the reform-minded countries were granted preferential
access. In this way the internal resistance to adjustment by
political interest groups may be weakened; it would become
evident that it is mainly in those interest groups' responsibi-
lity whether or not the country gains access to foreign capi-
tal.
- Apart from clearly defining the institutional framework for
international capital transfers, the removal of trade barriers
against Third World exports would be the most important contri-
bution of creditor governments. Comprehensive trade libera-
lization would add to the economic benefits of debtor countries
from policy reforms, work against the widespread export pessi-
mism and, hence, undermine the position of interest groups
opposing internal adjustment. Under present conditions, how-
ever, neither the GATT nor other organizations have effective
sanctions at their disposal so that previously announced libe-
ralization programs cannot be enforced. A feasible way out may
consist of a commitment of creditor governments to compensate
developing countries for refused liberalization by contingent
aid payments. Such a commitment is easier to enforce if com-
bined with a change of voting rights for member countries, e.g.
in the World Bank. Under a modified rule, the principle of "one
country - one vote" would be applied in decisions on contingent
aid allocations, provided the GATT notifies that the agreed
liberalization schedule has been violated. The maximum of funds
to be distributed under this modified rule is given by the
estimated welfare losses of recipient countries due to refused
liberalization.
Another reason for the limited explanatory power of the estimates
presented so far is that sovereign risk variables were not con-19
sidered explicitly. Table 5 reveals that the lending behaviour of
banks is strongly influenced by sovereign risk arguments. Most
notably, net transfers are smaller if the borrower's potential
benefits from default increase (proxied by EDTG and DSERG), and
higher if potential costs of default in terms of forgone trade
are relatively high (proxied by TRADE) . Hence it would be cru-
cially important for borrowers seeking for improved creditworthi-
ness to reduce sovereign risks.
Table 5 - The Impact of Sovereign Risk on Net Transfers to Developing Countries from Private Credit





















































































































variables defined as follows: EDTG: total external debt outstanding as per cent of GNP; DSERG: debt
service on long-term debt as per cent of GNP; TRADE: dependency on external trade relations (imports
plus exports as per cent of GDP); SHDEX: dependency on trade financing, proxied by short-term debt as
per cent of the borrower's exports; STDG: fluctuation in real GDP per capita; SHXDC: importance of bor-
rowing countries as export markets for the creditor nations. All explaining variables, except EDTG,
calculated as averages of periods t and t-1; t-statistics in parentheses; ** indicates significance at
the 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level; for methodical details, see Nunnenkamp [1989].
Source: Own calculations.
For additional calculations and a detailed interpretation of
results, see Nunnenkamp [1989].20
While no internationally binding legal system exists by which
sovereign risk can be contained, commitments to abstain from
willful default are credible only if transfer agreements are
self-enforcing. This may be achieved if borrowing countries agree
to supplement the traditional credit contracts by third-party
contracts. The latter must be enforceable within the domestic
legal system of the creditors and enable them to reject demands
for debt relief when the borrower is able to service his debt
[for an interesting proposal along these lines, see Stiiven,
1988] .
A less ambitious approach does not require any coordination be-
tween borrowers and lenders, nor institutional innovations. The
j
borrowers may attempt to reduce sovereign risks unilaterally by
implementing economic policies which limit the potential benefits
from willful default, and raise the potential costs of such a
behaviour. In view of the above results, outward-oriented devel-
opment strategies may be most helpful in this respect. Export
orientation and import liberalization render the capital-reci-
pient countries more dependent on continued trade relations.
Under such conditions the threat of creditors to impose trade
sanctions and to cut down trade-related financing is an effective
means to reduce the incentives for willful default. Moreover a
sound debt management may set limits to the potential benefits
from default, e.g. by reducing the extent and volatility of for-
eign debt accumulation and by avoiding any bunching of debt-ser-
vice obligations.
IV. Summary
It is widely agreed among economists and politicians that the
persistent debt problems of developing countries cannot be solved
without some form of debt relief. Even by the US government debt
reduction is now considered as an effective means to overcome the
negative effects of a debt overhang on economic adjustment in and
private lending to highly indebted countries. Moreover it is
hardly disputed that international organizations should play an21
important role in implementing and financing debt reduction
schemes.
The perception of debt relief as a panacea has been challenged in
this article. Viewed from a sovereign risk perspective it is
highly doubtful that both debtors and creditors would be better
off after having agreed to debt relief. Favourable effects on in-
ternal adjustment by debtor countries are difficult to enforce
and uncertain at best. The resistance of commercial banks to en-
gage in large-scale debt reduction schemes is likely to persist
unless private losses are at least partly assumed by the creditor
governments and international organizations. The socialization of
risks, however, would create new disincentive problems without
solving the existing ones. Most notably, private capital outflows
from developing countries may increase rather than decrease,
since access to capital markets is probably further impaired by
debt relief.
Especially for today's major problem borrowers it is impossible
to check the capital drain without encouraging private creditors
to resume lending. To regain international creditworthiness eco-
nomic policies should be implemented which enhance the future
debt-servicing capacity of borrowers and provide safeguards for
the creditors against willful default. Investments in export
generating activities are most important in both respects. Out-
ward-oriented industrialization adds to the potential costs of
debtors from willful default and, hence, reduces sovereign risks.
Creditor nations should help to weaken the resistance to economic
adjustment within highly indebted countries by clearly defining
the institutional framework for international capital transfers
and dismantling trade barriers against Third World exports. The
wait-and-see attitudes of both borrowers and lenders may be over-
come once the socialization of risks is unambiguously rejected. A
feasible way to enforce comprehensive liberalization programs may
consist of a commitment of creditor governments to compensate
developing countries for refused liberalization by contingent aid
payments, combined with a change in voting rights as far as the
allocation of these funds is concerned.22
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